SECTION IV

The Departments of Government

Chapter XIII: The Hebrew Chief Magistrate
Chapter XIV: The Constitution
Chapter XV: The Hebrew Senate
Chapter XVI: The Hebrew Commons
Chapter XVII: The Hebrew Oracle
Chapter XVIII: The Hebrew Priesthood
Chapter XIX: The Hebrew Prophets
Conclusion

Moses did not, by an express law, unalterably determine in what sort of magistrate the supreme executive authority of the Israelitish state should be lodged. On the contrary, he provided beforehand, in his Constitution, for a change in the form of the government and the title and prerogatives of its head, without subjecting the nation to the horrors of a civil war. And the change from the republican to the regal form, was in a subsequent age, actually accomplished without bloodshed or commotion, an event hardly paralleled by any other in history. Still, Moses was far from being indifferent in regard to the name and powers of the civil head of the state. His chief magistrate was a republican president, who had the title of judge, or rather, as Jahn says, governor, and was elective by the people.

A strange notion in regard to the chief magistracy of Israel has been entertained by several very learned authors, viz. that it was the design of Moses that the nation should, if possible, do without a chief executive officer. Such appears to have been the opinion of Harrington, Fleury, Lewis, Michaelis, Smith, and Dupin. Their idea would seem to have been that, considering how difficult it is to control power once entrusted to the hands of an individual, the lawgiver of Israel wished to have the ends of an executive answered in his republic, without setting apart a single person for that tempting distinction, trusting that, on emergencies, men would appear who could discharge the duty required by the occasion, without any other commission than their own preeminent qualifications, instinctively acknowledged by the public voice. In the view of these writers, the judges were all extraordinary magistrates, not unlike the dictators in ancient Rome.

I have called this a strange opinion, because a state without a chief magistrate is as monstrous as a body without a head. But I must add that, notwithstanding the great names by which it is supported, it appears to me wholly without foundation. If I look either to the conduct or the laws of Moses, I can discover no ground for such an idea. Let us first take his acts for our guide in the study of this point. Moses himself was, unquestionably, the chief magistrate of the Hebrew state. Now, when he had finished his course, and the time of his departure was at hand, about to yield up the authority which he had so long and usefully exercised, he was mainly anxious to provide a suitable successor in that office, a man of courage, prudence, piety, and other needful gifts of government.¹ He was to be one who should go out and come in before them; that is, he was to have the command of their armies in war, and the direction of their civil affairs in peace. As to the opinion that this was to be an extraordinary magistracy, it is pure assumption. No intimation is given, that it was to last only during the conquest and settlement of Canaan. The reason assigned by Moses for his anxiety in the matter, viz. that the congregation of Jehovah be not as sheep that have no shepherd, seems to me to settle the question beyond doubt or cavil. Sheep without a shepherd would be as appropriate a symbol of Israel without a chief magistrate after the settlement of Canaan, as before it. This reason for the office of leader or head, viz. its great usefulness or importance to the well-being of the body politic, which are inherent and permanent qualities, stamps it as an essential and standing part of the constitution. And this is conformable to the general sentiment and practice of mankind. The wisest nations have ever deemed it convenient to have a first magistrate, either hereditary or elective, either for life or a term of years, who should be the commander-in-chief of their armies, and who should preside over the civil administration. No otherwise can the force of a nation be properly employed for its protection, and its laws duly executed.

1 Numbers 27:15-17.

 

But, again, if we look at the laws of Moses, we shall come to the same conclusion, viz. that the opinion I am combating is without any solid foundation. Michaelis says, truly, that Moses gave no law imposing an obligation on the people to choose one universal magistrate of the whole nation. Yet he at least does that which is equivalent; he manifestly takes it for granted that the nation would have such a magistrate. Thus in Deuteronomy 17:9, the judge of the whole republic is mentioned in connection with the high priest, and that, not as a military, but as a civil functionary. In the twelfth verse of the same chapter, the word "judge" is used as a title of supreme authority. A still more decisive passage occurs in 2 Samuel 7:11. It is an address which Jehovah, by the mouth of the prophet Nathan, made to king David, concerning his intention to build him a house. The divine speaker, in a distinct allusion to the chief magistrates of Israel, prior to the institution of monarch, says expressly, "I commanded judges to be over my people Israel." Upon the whole, there can be no reasonable doubt that, as the Lacedaemonians had their kings, the Athenians their archons, and Romans their consuls, so, according to the constitution of Moses, the Hebrews were to have their general judges, or governors of the whole republic. As to what is alleged by some, as a ground of belief that Moses did not intend to have an unbroken succession of chief magistrates, that, prior to the establishment of monarchy, there were times when the nation was without a civil head, and that the authority of some of the judges did not extend to all Israel, but was limited to particular tribes, that is undoubtedly true. But it is a fact which may be ccounted for on more rational grounds than the theory of these writers. It was the result of a neglect, rather than an observance, of the Mosaic constitution, a neglect, in all probability, occasioned by the jealous rivalry between the different tribes, as explained in the last chapter.

In order to a just understanding of the frame and operation of the Hebrew government, it is material to inquire, both what were the powers, and what the limitations of power, appertaining to this magistracy. If we would conceive justly of the office, we must study it, as it was instituted and exercised by Moses and Joshua, in whose history alone we may expect to find an exact and true account of it, since, after the death of the latter, this part of the constitution was very soon altered or neglected, there being no regent or judge in the land.²

2 Judges 19:1.

 

The supreme authority of the Hebrew state was in Jehovah. God himself was properly king of Israel. With respect to this divine king, Moses, as Conringius says, might not improperly be called his viceroy. It is evident from the whole history, and therefore particular citations are not necessary to prove, that Moses was clothed with very ample powers. He had authority to convene the states-general of Israel, to preside over their deliberations, to command the army, to appoint officers, and to hear and decide civil causes.

But it may be alleged, and it is certainly true, that Moses had an authority depending, in a peculiar manner, on God himself. Let us, therefore, look at this office of chief magistrate as exercised by Joshua. We find a somewhat detailed account of it, in the narrative of his appointment as the successor Moses. The historian says,³ "And the Lord said unto Moses, Take thee Joshua the son of Nun, a man in whom is the spirit, and lay thine hand upon him: and set him before Eleazar the priest, and before all the congregation: and give him a charge in their sight. And thou shalt put some of thine honor upon him, that all the congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient. And he shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him after the judgment of urim before the Lord: at his word shall they go out, and at his word they shall come in, both he, and all the children of Israel with him, even all the congregation. And Moses did as the Lord commanded him: and he took Joshua, and set him before Eleazar the priest, and before all the congregation. And he laid his hands upon him, and gave him a charge, as the Lord commanded by the hand of Moses."

We learn, still more clearly, the nature of this part of the Hebrew constitution, from the history of Joshua’s accession to the government. "Now, after the death of Moses, the servant of the Lord, it came to pass, that the Lord spake unto Joshua, the son of Nun, Moses’ minister."⁴ The object of this address was to encourage him to take upon himself the government of the Israelites.⁵ Thereupon the new regent immediately issues his orders:⁶ "Then Joshua commanded the officers of the people, saying, Pass through the host and command the people, saying, Prepare you victuals: for within three days ye shall pass over this Jordan, to go in to possess the land which the Lord your God giveth you to possess it." Then he summoned the tribes, who had received their inheritance east of the Jordan, and directed them to accompany their brethren, and assist them in taking possession of their portion on the western side of that river.⁷ Their reply was remarkable, and deserves be inserted at length; as we distinctly see from it their conception of the nature and extent of the authority which was vested in Joshua:⁸ "And they answered Joshua, saying, All that thou commandest us, we will do, and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will go. According as we hearkened unto Moses in all things, so will we hearken unto thee: only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moses. Whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment, and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death: only be strong and of a good courage."

3 Numbers 27:18-23.

4 Joshua 1:1.

5 Joshua 1:2-9.

6 Joshua 1:10-11.

7 Joshua 1:12-15.

8 Joshua 1:16-18.

 

These are the principal passages relating to the office of chief magistrate among the Hebrews, as it was exemplified in the history of the first two judges. A critical analysis of them establishes several important conclusions.

1. The Hebrew judges held their office for life. There was unquestionably a disadvantage attendant upon this arrangement. On the death of a judge, the supreme executive authority ceased. This often led to anarchy, or at least to great disorders, in consequence of a delay in electing a successor. In virtue of the English maxim of law, that the king never dies, all the rights of the sovereign, on his demise, instantly vest in his heir. Perhaps, however, the disadvantage resulting from the adoption of the opposite principle in the Hebrew polity, was more than counterbalanced by its preventing a degenerate heir, or successor, from giving to idolatry the support of his influence.

2. The office was not hereditary. Moses took no steps to perpetuate this magistracy in his family, or to leave it as a hereditary honor to his posterity. He did not even seek to confine it within his own tribe. All he desired, in his successor, was a man fit for the office, a man in whom was the spirit of prudence, courage, and the fear of God, with all the other gifts of government necessary in an upright, patriotic, zealous, and able chief magistrate. Joshua, the immediate successor of Moses, was of the tribe of Ephraim; Othniel was of Judah; Ehud, of Benjamin; Deborah, of Naphtali; Gideon, of Manasseh; and Samuel, of Levi. The other judges were of several different tribes, and, they being dead, their children remained among the common people, and we hear no more of them. "Let the supreme authority be given to the worthiest," is the voice of reason. "Let the supreme authority be given to the worthiest," is echoed back by the Mosaic constitution, as face answers face in water, and the heart of man to man.

3. The chief magistracy of Israel was elective. The oracle, the high priest, and all the congregation, are distinctly recorded to have concurred in the elevation of Joshua to this office.⁹ Jephthah was chosen the chief magistracy by the popular voice.¹⁰ Samuel was elected regent in a general assembly of Israel.¹¹ And, for aught that appears, the other judges were raised to this office by the free, unsolicited choice of the people.

4. The authority of these regents extended to affairs of war and peace. They were commanders-in-chief of the military forces of the Israelites, and chief judges in civil causes. That Moses united these functions in his person is undisputed. He administered justice, as well as commanded armies. That Joshua did the same, that his authority was, in these particulars, of an equal extent, is also clear. Moses was directed to put some of his honor upon him, that all the congregation of the children of Israel might be obedient.¹² What does this mean, but that, as suggested by bishop Patrick, Moses communicated to Joshua some of his own authority, and made him an associate in the government? But the point is yet clearer from the words, in which the trans-Jordanic tribes recognized Joshua’s authority: "All that thou commanest us we will do, and whithersoever thou sendest us we will go. According as we hearkened unto Moses in all things, so will we hearken unto thee."¹³ This is explicit and unequivocal. the authority of Joshua was co-extensive with that of Moses, and comprehended civil as well as military affairs. Most of the succeeding judges had been at the head of armies, had delivered their country from foreign oppression, and were elevated to the chief magistracy in reward of their military exploits. Eli and Samuel, however, certainly were not military men. Deborah was judge, and held her court under a palm tree, before she planned the war against Jabin.¹⁴ Of Jair, Ibzan, Elon, and Abdon, it is uncertain whether they ever held any military command. The judges are mentioned in the Mosaic law, in connection with the high priest, as arbiters of civil controversies.¹⁵ The command of the army cannot, therefore, be considered as the peculiar, much less the exclusive function of these magistrates. They appear rather to have been appointed for the general administration of public affairs. It is true that martial achievements were, in several instances, the means by which men raised themselves to the rank of judges; but the present inquiry is, not how the office was obtained, but for what ends it was instituted.

The authority of the judge was, without doubt, very great. As general, he had the chief command of the army; as civil head of the state, he convened the senate and congregation, presided in those assemblies, proposed the public business, exercised a powerful influence over their deliberations, and, in all things, acted as viceroy of Jehovah, the invisible King of Israel. He was the fountain of justice, and the executive power of the government was principally lodged in his hands.

9 Numbers 28:19,22.

10 Judges 11:4-11.

11 1 Samuel 7:5-8.

12 Numbers 28:20.

13 Joshua 1:16-17.

14 Judges 4:4-5.

15 Deuteronomy 17:9,12.

 

5. A contumacious resistance of the lawful authority and orders of the Hebrew judges was treason. This is plain from the address of the eastern tribes to Joshua, in formally recognizing him as the head of the nation, and promising allegiance to his government. "Whosoever be," they say, "that doth rebel against thy commandment, and will not hearken unto thy words, in all that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death."¹⁶ It is, perhaps, still plainer from Deuteronomy 17:12: "The man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto...the judge, even that man shall die." And this was consonant to reason and justice; for, the chief authority, both in military and civil affairs, being vested in him, he embodied and represented the majesty of the state. Rebellion against him was rebellion against the supreme power. It was a violation of all order and government, an attempt to frustrate the will of the nation, an act of mutiny and sedition—offenses, which, in all governments, have been regarded and treated as capital crimes.

6. The authority of the Israelitish regents was not unlimited and despotic. It was tempered and restrained by the oracle. This is distinctly affirmed in the history of the appointment of Joshua to the chief magistracy as the successor of Moses.¹⁷ It is there said that he should stand before Eleazar the priest, who should ask counsel for him, after the judgment of urim before the Lord. This implies an obligation to follow the counsel, when given. This use of the oracle throws light on some parts of the Hebrew history, which are commonly not well understood. In particular, it suggests the reason why the Israelites were so often conquered and oppressed by their enemies. It was either because of their rashness in trusting to their own wisdom, without asking counsel of the oracle, or because of their neglect to follow the counsels which they received from it. In either case, the behavior of the Hebrews could not be otherwise than highly criminal, under this constitution, and, of course, highly provoking to their divine King. The power of the Hebrew chief magistrates was further limited by that of the senate and congregation. In ordinary cases, it would seem they were not bound to consult the states-general. It was enough, if these did not remonstrate against the measures of the judge—a procedure to which they were by no means backward in resorting, whenever, in their judgment, occasion required it. But, in important emergencies, they summoned a general assembly of the rulers, to ask their advice and consent. This we find to have been repeatedly done by Moses, Joshua, and Samuel.

16 Joshua 1:18.

17 Numbers 27:21.

 

Still another limitation to the authority of the Hebrew judges was in the law itself. Their power could not be stretched beyond its legal bounds. This is pretty plainly intimated in the address of the people to Joshua, on his accession to the chief magistracy. They say, in effect, that they would be obedient to him, provided he himself would obey the law of Jehovah, and follow the path traced out by his servant Moses.¹⁸ This magistracy was always in subjection to the law, nor, as far as appears from the history, did any of the judges ever abuse the power committed to them, unless we except Gideon, who, through his own superstition, gave some slight encouragement to idolatry. As it is a maxim of the British monarchy that the law maketh the king, so, it was a principle of the Hebrew commonwealth, that the law made the judge; and as, under the English constitution, he is not king, where will and pleasure rule, and not the law; so, under the Israelitish constitution, he would not long have continued judge, who, trampling on the law, should have made his own will the rule of his administration.

18 Joshua 1:17.

 

The observation may appear singular, yet I believe it to be true, that the constitution of Carthage throws light on this part of the constitution of Israel. "The history of the Carthaginians," observes Michaelis, "will here assist us in forming more accurate ideas of this chief magistrate of the Israelitish republic, and in comparing his office with a well known European one. In the Hebrew language, a judge is called schofet. The Carthaginians, who were descendants of the Tyrians, and spoke Hebrew, called their chief magistrate by that name. But the Latins, who had no such sch, as we have, wrote the word with a sharp s, and, adding a Latin termination, denominated them suffetes. By the historian Liby, they are compared to the Roman consuls. In book 28, chapter 38, he says, ‘Ad colloquium suffetes eorum, qui summus Poenis est magistratus, cum quaestore elicuit.’ There, however, he is speaking, not of the suffetes of the city of Carthage itself, but of inferior ones. But in book 30, chaper 7, he mentions the former in these words: ‘Senatum suffetes, quod velut consulare apud imperium erat, vocaverunt.’ Now such were the judges of Israel, whose history is recorded in the book called by their name."

No salary was attached to the chief magistracy in the Hebrew government. No revenues were appropriated to the judges, except, perhaps, a larger share of the spoils taken in war, and the presents, spontaneously made to them as testimonials of respect.¹⁹ No tribute was raised for them. They had no outward badges of dignity. They did not wear the diadem. They were not surrounded by a crowd of satellites. They were not invested with the sovereign power. They could issue orders, but they could not enact laws. They had not the right of appointing officers, except perhaps in the army. They had no power to lay new burdens upon the people in the form of taxes. They were ministers of justice, protectors of law, defenders of religion, and avengers of crime, particularly the crime of idolatry. But their power was constitutional, not arbitrary. It was kept within due bounds by the barriers of law, the decisions of the oracle, and the advice and consent of the senate and commons of Israel. They were without show, without pomp, without retinue, without equipage—plain republican magistrates. "They were not only simple in their manners, moderate in their desires, and free from avarice and ambition, but noble and magnanimous men, who felt that whatever they did for their country was above all reward and could not be recompensed—who desired merely to promote the public good, and who chose rather to deserve well of their country than to be enriched by its wealth. This exalted patriotism, like everything else connected with politics in the theocratical state of the Hebrews, was partly of a religious character, and those regents always conducted themselves as the officers of God. In all their enterprises, they relied upon him, and their only care was that their countrymen should acknowledge the authority of Jehovah, their invisible King. Still, they were not without faults, neither are they so represented by their historians. These relate, on the contrary, with the utmost frankness, the great sins of which some of them were guilty. They were not merely deliverers of the state from a foreign yoke, but destroyers of idolatry; foes of pagan vices; promoters of the knowledge of God, of religion, and of morality; restorers of theocracy in the minds of the Hebrews; and powerful instruments of divine providence in the promotion of the great design of preserving the Hebrew constitution, and, by that means, of rescuing the true religion from destruction."

19 Judges 8:24; 1 Samuel 9:7, 10:27.

 

Such was the chief magistrate of Israel, as created by the constitution of Moses. It will be interesting and not unimportant to inquire into the state of the country during the government of the judges. Very grave errors on this point, and such as are calculated to discredit the wisdom of this constitution, have been committed by authors, otherwise candid and learned. It has been by no means uncommon to represent the four hundred and fifty years during which this consular magistracy lasted, as times of imbecility, confusion, anarchy, barbarism, and crime. Harrington speaks of the Israelitish commonwealth, during this period, as "without any sufficient root for the possible support of it, or with such roots only as were full of worms." Lowman speaks of "the weak state of the Hebrews," and Smith, of "the moral and social deterioration of the people," during the same period. Nothing can be more unfounded or unjust than such representations. This error is probably grounded on another, viz. that of regarding the book of Judges as a complete history of the times of the judges. But such it manifestly is not. The book is exceedingly fragmentary as a narrative, being made up rather of heads of history, than history itself. It is aptly characterized by Jahn as "a mere register of diseases, from which, however, we have no right to conclude, that there were no healthy men, much less that there were no healthy seasons; when the book itself, for the most part, mentions only a few tribes, in which the epidemic prevailed, and notices long periods, during which it had universally ceased." If anyone will attentively read over the book of Judges, and take the trouble to compare the times of oppression and adversity with those of independence and prosperity, he will find the duration of the former less than one fourth that of the latter. The entire history of one hundred and twenty years of this period is contained in these two brief records: "The land had rest forty years,"²⁰ "the land had rest four score years."²¹ Ehud and Shamgar must have governed with prudence and ability, since all the time of their administration was prosperous and peaceable, both within and without. It is quite apparent, therefore, that the Israelites experienced much more of prosperity than of adversity in the time of the judges. Under their government, the nation enjoyed periods of repose, happiness, and plenty, of which the history of other ancient nations affords but few examples. Wherefore, then, change the republican to the regal form? Pride and folly prompted the revolution, a revolution soon repented of with bitter but unavailing regrets, a revolution in which lay buried the seeds of despotism and ultimate dissolution.

20 Judges 3:11.

21 Judges 3:30.

 

This magistracy of judge, regent, or consul was the true primitive arrangement of the Hebrew constitution. This the wisdom of the divine lawgiver appointed as one of the bonds, whereby the tribes were to be united in the power of their arms, in their national councils, and in the administration of justice. If Moses, in framing his polity, had stopped here, it would have been necessary for anyone, in analyzing and describing it, to arrest himself at the same point. But since he provided for the establishment of the regal form of government among the Hebrews, whenever they should tire of republican simplicity, and since he enacted a fundamental law to define and limit the power of the future kings, the study of the Hebrew chief magistracy involves an examination of the regal office, nor would the analysis of the Mosaic constitution be complete without it. To this labor, therefore, I now address myself.

The law, referred to in the last paragraph, is in these words: "When thou art come into the land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are about me: Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee whom the Lord thy God shall choose: one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee: thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother. But he shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt, to the end that he should multiply horses: forasmuch as the Lord hath said unto you, Ye shall henceforth return no more that way. Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, that his heart turn not away: neither shall he greatly multiply to himself silver and gold. And it shall be when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book out of that which is before the priests the Levites. And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life: that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them: that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment to the right hand or to the left: to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he, and his children, in the midst of Israel."²²

22 Deuteronomy 17:14-20.

 

Agreeably to the provisions of this enactment, the nation was at liberty, whenever it thought fit, to institute the regal form of government; the king was to be chosen by the concurrent voice of the people and the oracle; the sovereign must be a native Israelite; the multiplication of horses was interdicted to him; he was not to have many wives; he might not accumulate and hoard large treasures; he was to be the defender of religion; the law must be the rule of his government; he must regard his people as brethren and equals; and, upon these conditions, the throne was to be hereditary in his family. I propose briefly to illustrate each of these particulars.

1. Monarchy was permitted to the Israelites. Moses was not ignorant of the temper of the orientals. He knew their strong propensity to kingly government, which, at a later period on the world’s history was remarked by the Greeks and Romans. He well understood, also, the general mutability of human affairs. On these grounds, he anticipated, and the law under consideration presupposes, what afterwards took place—a desire in the Hebrew people to have a king, in imitation of the polity of other eastern nations. For the gratification of this desire in a peaceful way, Moses provided in this law. Among the immediate causes of this change in the Hebrew constitution, we may probably, without error, enumerate the effeminacy and cowardice of the people; the disunion and jealousy of the tribes; the formidable power of the Ammonites and the Philistines, from whose incursions the eastern and southern tribes were constant sufferers; the fear that, after the death of Samuel, being left without a supreme regent, and consequently becoming disunited, they would fall a prey to these terrible enemies; the degeneracy of Samuel’s sons; the example of all their neighbors; the idea of the greater respectability of a nation with a king at its head; the desire or the necessity of being always ready for war; a want of faith and constancy in the Hebrew mind; and, more than all perhaps, a weak longing after the pomp and glitter of royalty. But, whatever the cause might be, the change was made. It conduces not a little to the honor of the Hebrews, that they effected it in accordance with the principles of theocracy, and without bloodshed. This is a clear proof that the time of the judges was neither an impious nor a barbarous age.

2. The right of election was left to the people, subject to this limitation, however—that they were not to appoint anyone as king who was not chosen by God. At first view, the two parts of this proposition appear contradictory to each other. But the difficulty vanishes when it is understood as simply implying that the oracle and the states-general must concur in the choice. In some of our state legislatures, United States senators are elected by a separate vote of each house, in which case the two houses must be of accord, or there is no election. The case was analogous in the election of an Israelitish sovereign. The people and the oracle must concur. A fair interpretation of the statute itself will lead to this conclusion. "Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose: one from among thy brethren shalt thou set over thee. Thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother."²³ That the oracle was to be consulted in the election, this passage places beyond doubt. That the people also were to have a voice in the transaction, it makes almost equally clear. The earnest cautions, addressed to them in reference to the choice of a sovereign, would be absurd, if all liberty of action were absolutely taken from them, and they were simply to receive one, arbitrarily imposed upon them by the will of another.

But the meaning of the statute may be best studied in the actual application of it. In this, as in other instances, the history throws light upon the code. In regard to the institution of the monarchy, and Saul’s elevation to the throne, let anyone attentively read that part of the first book of Samuel, which is contained in chapters 8-11, and he will find set forth in it the following facts. Samuel convoked the general diet of Israel at Mizpeh. Then, after recounting the Lord’s past mercies to them, he reminded them that, in demanding a king, they had rejected Jehovah, who had himself saved them out of all their adversities. He then called them to present themselves before the Lord by their tribes. On the application of the sacred lot, the tribe of Benjamin was taken. Afterward, in a similar manner, the family of Matri was taken; and then, in the same way, Saul, the son of Kish, was selected. Samuel then presented the nominee of the oracle to the representatives of the people for their approval and confirmation. Many of them, probably a majority, gave an affirmative vote. But a powerful minority opposed his investiture with the royal authority, on the ground that they did not believe him possessed of sufficient military talent and experience to lead the Israelitish armies to victory. The narrative inclines me to think that Saul was not inaugurated and invested with the kingly power on this occasion. The circumstances, which seem to me to render this a probable opinion, are the following. Saul assumed neither the state nor the authority of a king, but went back to his agricultural pursuits in Gibeah, as aforetime. No tribute was levied for him, nor any arrangement made for supporting the regal dignity. He received gifts from only a few, while by many he was openly contemned. The mass of the people paid him scarcely any deference at all. Samuel did not let go the reins of government, nor resign his power as chief magistrate of Israel; for his authority was joined to that of Saul in summoning the Israelites to the assistance of Jabesh-gilead, against Nahash, king of the Ammonites. In this war, Saul exhibited military talents of a high order. Nor were the moderation and clemency displayed by him, at its close, towards those who had opposed his elevation to the throne, less signal. His valor, prudence, and magnanimity completely won the confidence and the heart of the nation. Samuel, taking advantage of this favorable temper of the people, convened a general assembly at Gilgal, proposed Saul as king a second time, and obtained a unanimous vote in his favor. Then, for the first time, it is said, that they, that is, the people, made Saul king, and gave themselves up to great and general rejoicing. Immediately after his inauguration, Samuel formally resigned his office as judge, surrendering his authority into the hands of the people, from whom he had received it, and by whom he was honorably exonerated from all charge of blame in his public administration, and the fullest testimony was borne to the purity of his official conduct. Josephus says, that, on the occasion of Saul’s election and inauguration at Gilgal, Samuel anointed him a second time. This seems not improbable, though the circumstance is not mentioned by the sacred historian; for the first anointing was a private transaction, and he was not anointed when elected by the lot. From this time Saul assumed the reins of government, and was regarded as the lawful sovereign of Israel.

How clearly do we see from this detail, that the choice of a king in Israel was neither in the oracle nor the people separately, but in both conjointly, since the decision of the former did not take effect till it was ratified and confirmed by the action of the latter. How manifest is it, that the miraculous designation of magistrates in the Hebrew commonwealth was never understood to exclude the free suffrage of the people in their election. If these things still seem to any irreconcilable, we are able to adduce examples of their coexistence even out of the history of heathen states. It is related by Livy of Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius that, before they were raised to the regal dignity at Rome, the one had his hat taken off, borne aloft into the air, and fitly deposited again in its place by an eagle; and the other had a flame resting on his head, which, after being for some time an object of terror to the beholders, glided off, on his awaking out of sleep, without leaving any trace of its presence on his person. By these portents it was believed that each of them was designated of the deity to be king. Still, neither by themselves nor others were they interpreted as giving them a right to the throne, much less as excluding the popular suffrage from their election, or authorizing the opinion that any man ought to be king of Rome whom the people had not first chosen to reign over them. Certainly I would not be understood, from this illustration, as intending to compare the vain prodigies of the heathens with the true miracles of the Israelites. Yet it should be remembered that each people had a like opinion of each. God raised up judges for his people Israel. That the scripture plainly asserts. But to infer from hence, that the people did not elect them, would be false reasoning, since the fact is unquestionable that they did. So, that God elected Saul to be king of Israel is certain. Yet it is just as certain that the people did, nonetheless for that, themselves elect him likewise. The one certainly is as strong as the other.

The history of David’s elevation to the throne still further illustrates the meaning of the statute under consideration. The house of Saul had, by God’s command, on account of his infractions of the law, been excluded from the succession.²⁴ The prophet Samuel had, by direction of the oracle, privately anointed David as the successor of Saul.²⁵ The subsequent history shows that unction did not, of itself alone, confer a full and valid title to the crown of Israel. When Saul had been slain in a battle with the Philistines, an Amalekite stripped him of his crown, and brought it to David.²⁶ Did David consider himself entitled to wear it? By no means. He assumed neither the crown itself, nor the authority of which it was the symbol. He returned, with his followers, to the city of Hebron, as a private citizen. In that capacity, he abode there for some time, until, as the historian states, "the men of Judah [the citizens, the people of that tribe] came and anointed David king over the house of Judah."²⁷ Thus did David, by the joint act of the oracle and the people, become king of Judah. The other eleven tribes raised Ishbosheth, a son of Saul, to the sovereign power, and adhered to him for seven years.²⁸ Did David, for that, regard them as guilty of treason? Not in the least. Yet that would have followed inevitably, if his unction by Samuel had given him a legal right to the throne of all Israel. David defended himself (as who would not?) when attacked by the army of Ishbosheth,²⁹ but he made no attempt to reduce the eleven tribes to allegiance to his government by force of arms. When at length they submitted themselves to his scepter, their submission was voluntary. They freely chose him for their king, yet, in doing so, it is remarkable that they distinctly recognized the part which the oracle had previously taken in his election.³⁰ Here, again, we perceive the concurrence of the oracle and the people in the choice of a person to fill the throne of Israel.

It is probable, as we shall see in the sequel, that David, when he was made king, reserved the right of naming his successor. But, notwithstanding this, it is clear that a general diet was held, that Solomon was formally proposed to them, and that they, by their free suffrages, confirmed the royal nomination.³¹ It was not till after this vote that Solomon was anointed and inaugurated, and the people gave themselves up to the festivities suited to the occasion. The history adds, "Then [i.e., after his election by the congregation] Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord as king, instead of David his father, and prospered; and all Israel obeyed him. And all the princes, and the mighty men, and all the sons likewise of king David, submitted themselves unto Solomon the king."³² Manifestly, this submission and obedience were rendered to him as having been constitutionally elected to the regal office.

23 Deuteronomy 17:15.

24 1 Samuel 15:11,26,28.

25 1 Samuel 16:13.

26 2 Samuel 1:10.

27 2 Samuel 2:1-4.

28 2 Samuel 2:8,11.

29 2 Samuel 2:12-30.

30 2 Samuel 5:1-3.

31 1 Chronicles 29:20-22.

32 1 Chronicles 29:23-24.

 

3. The Hebrew sovereign was to be a native Hebrew citizen; he was to be elected from his brethren; no foreigner was to sit on the throne of Israel. This was a politic and patriotic law. A foreigner might change the constitution, or raise us a faction in direct opposition to the national interest. Foreigners were heathens and would be more inclined than Israelites to violate the fundamental law of the state by the introduction of idolatry. But this law was grossly misinterpreted in the later periods of the Jewish history. It was understood as forbidding, on the part of the Hebrews, submission to those foreign powers under whose dominion they had been brought through the overruling providence of God. It was on the ground of this misinterpretation of the law that the Jews proposed that insidious question to our Lord: "Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar, or not?"³³ for they were at that time under a foreign power, Judea being a Roman province. If he had said Yes, they intended to destroy him through the charge of subverting this law of Moses; if he had answered no, they meant to crush him by the power of Rome. But the law had, in reality, no reference to such a case. It referred to free elections. Moses speaks only of kings chosen by the Israelites themselves. A law, such as the later Jews conceived this to be, would inevitably have led to the annihilation of a conquered people. The conquerors, unable to trust their fidelity or rely upon their allegiance, would be driven to the necessity, either of putting them all to the sword, or scattering them by slavery. The Hebrew prophets interpreted the law quite differently from the Hebrew zealots. Jeremiah and Ezekiel exhorted their countrymen, when now a conquered people, to submit quietly to the Chaldeans, and conduct themselves as loyal subjects of the Babylonish government.

33 Matthew 22:17.

 

4. The Hebrew king was not to multiply horses. As the Israelites made no use of horses in agriculture, and but little as beasts of burden, employing for these purposes oxen and asses, and as they made most of their journeys on foot, and of course did not need them for traveling, this must be understood as a prohibition against maintaining a strong force of cavalry. For defense cavalry was unnecessary. On the West Palestine had the sea. On the North, its barrier was a range of lofty and almost impassable mountains, where a mounted soldiery would be of little use. To the East and South, it was bounded by vast deserts, where an enemy’s cavalry could not subsist, for want of forage. The only object, therefore, for which an Israelitish sovereign could desire to keep any considerable force of this description, would be to make foreign conquests. But it was against the whole scope of the Mosaic law, nay, subversive of its fundamental purpose, that the Hebrews should be conquerors of foreign countries, and their king a universal monarch. And as the keeping of a strong body of horse could hardly fail to engender a spirit of foreign conquest, it was expressly interdicted to the head of the state. He was especially forbidden to attempt the conquest of Egypt in order to obtain horses.

5. The Israelitish sovereign was still further forbidden to marry many wives; so early were women dreaded as the corrupters of royalty. I look upon this law as a prohibition against keeping a numerous harem, or a state seraglio—that inseparable accompaniment of eastern despotism. Besides the inherent tendency of the thing to render kings effeminate and dissolve their hearts in indolence and pleasure, there was a special reason against it in the Israelitish polity. It is incident to the keeping of a harem, as a matter of royal state, that the monarch seek out and collect together the most beautiful women of all nations. But all other nations at that time were idolaters. Moses dreaded the influence of heathen beauties upon the religious principles and character of the Hebrew kings. He feared that it would lead to the introduction and practice of idolatry. How reasonable his fears were, the history of Solomon affords a memorable and melancholy proof. His harem contained a thousand women, many of whom were Moabites, Ammonites, Edomites, Zidonians, and Hittites, besides the daughter of Pharaoh—"strange women." His wives turned away his heart after other gods. He appears to have built temples for them all, and himself joined in paying divine honors to Ashtoreth, and Milcom, and Chemosh, and Molech. The conduct of Solomon places in a very striking light the wisdom of this statute, at the same time that it shows that none of the laws of Moses were less observed than this. It shows further that the spirit of monarchy, at least in the form in which it has always been found in the East, was repugnant to the genius of the Mosaic legislation.

6. The king was not greatly to multiply to himself silver and gold. Moses dreaded wealth, not less than women, as tending to the corruption of royalty. The possession of great treasure naturally leads to luxury, which is an enemy to virtue. It is, moreover, in a monarch, a great engine of despotism. He may use it for crushing the liberties of the people. The hoarding up of large treasures by the sovereign tends obstruct the circulation of money, discourage industry, and impoverish his subjects. the Israelitish king, observes Lewis, "was allowed to lay up money in the treasury at the temple, for the occasions of the state, but was forbidden to fill his own coffers for his private interest, lest he should squeeze his subjects, and exact more of them than they were able to bear." There is, undoubtedly, as Michaelis has noticed, a wide and obvious difference between these two sorts of treasure. That laid up in the public treasury, the king could not use, without the consent of the other branches of the government. Of course, he could not pervert it to the purposes of tyranny, on pretense of applying it to the public service. David had collected large treasures for the sanctuary.³⁴ According to the common reckoning, they amounted, in round numbers, to four thousand three hundred and five million dollars, a sum almost beyond belief. Michaelis (in his Commentary on the Age anterior to the Babylonish Captivity, § 7) estimates the shekel at one tenth the value usually assigned to it. This would reduce the amount to four hundred and thirty millions. But Kennicott is of the opinion that, in the enumeration, a cipher too many has crept in. Cutting off that, there still remain forty three million dollars, which, says Michaelis, for David’s time, is still a very great treasure, and only to be accounted for, from the plunder of so many nations.

34 1 Chronicles 22:14.

 

7. The sovereign of Israel must be the defender of religion. Judaism could exist only in a constant triumph over idolatry. "By the fundamental law of the Hebrew commonwealth, the king was forbidden to introduce any new mode of religious worship. Neither could he, like the kings of other nations, perform the functions of a priest, unless he was of the tribe of Aaron, as was the case with the Asmonean princes. On the contrary, he was required to reign as the representative and vassal of Jehovah, to promote the institutions of religion as a matter of obedience to him, and to attend to the declarations of the prophets, as his ambassadors."

8. The law, and not the king’s own will and pleasure, was to be the rule of his administration. This point was made very prominent in the statute, as the reader will perceive by recurring to it. The king was required to make, or cause to be made, an accurate transcript of the law out of the book, which was before the priests, the Levites; that is, probably the autograph, kept in the tabernacle. This he must have with him continually, and read therein all the days of his life, to the end that he might learn to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them. He might not "turn to the right hand or to the left." From this we see that the laws were supreme. The kings were as much bound to serve them as the private citizens. They had no power to make or repeal a single statute. We have here a perfect exemplification of a government of laws. the constitutional king of Israel could not assume and exercise arbitrary power, without first trampling under foot the fundamental law of the state. Moses made him simply the first citizen. He aimed also at making him the wisest, the purest, and the best.

9. The king must be gracious and condescending towards his subjects. His heart must not be lifted up. He must look upon his people, not only as equals, but as brethren. We find the best kings cherishing this sentiment, and acting upon it. When David addressed the states-general, he rose before them, and used this affectionate compellation: "Hear me my brethren, and my people."³⁵ On this foundation the Hebrew doctors have established the rule that the king must render honor to the general assembly; when it presents itself before him, he must rise from his seat, and receive it standing.

When Joash was anointed king, mention is again made of a covenant between him and the people.⁶ But here, again, the history gives us no certain information concerning its contents. Yet there is no doubt that the design of the people, in imposing this capitulation upon their king, is to bring the royal prerogative, stretched beyond all bounds in the preceding reigns, within something like the original limits affixed to it the law of Moses.

1 I Samuel 10:25.

2 2 Samuel 5:3.

3 1 Kings 1:20.

4 1 Kings 1:25-27.

5 1 Kings 12:1-20.

6 2 Kings 6:17.

 

Upon the whole, it is quite clear that the king of Israel was not an unlimited monarch, as the defenders of the divine right of kings, and the passive obedience of subjects, have been accustomed to represent him. How could he be so, when every tribe was under its own chief, and its own government and common weal, and even exercised the right of war? Saul, the first of the kings, appears to have had very little power. In the beginning of his reign (if his reign commenced at his at election, according to the common opinion, which, however, I doubt, for reasons previously assigned), he still pursued the business of husbandry, apparently laboring with his own hands.⁷ Afterwards, his army, even in the field, shared with him many of the rights of the supreme power.⁸ In the reign of David, such was the power of this army that he found it prudent to allow two murders, perpetrated by its general, Joab, to go unpunished, though he did so with extreme reluctance. In this, we may perhaps think that we perceive the marks of a military government, where the army is omnipotent, and while it renders the king independent of the people, still keeps him in subjection to itself. But this was by no means the case. For, in the first place, the army was the people; and both Harrington and Lowman are of the opinion that its officers were, to a great extent at least, the deputies who composed the general diets of Israel. But secondly, the military was so in subjection to the civil power, the king and the army were so limited by the liberty of the people, that the king appears not given to have had the right to demand of the cities of Israel the opening of their gates to his troops. The story, contained in 2 Samuel 20:1-20, seems to warrant this conclusion. Sheba, a rebel, had thrown himself into the city of Abel. Joab besieged it by David’s orders. The citizens declared that they had no share in the rebellion. They did not, however, on that account, open their gates to Joab; but they sent him the rebel’s head, and he quietly retired with his troops. Even Solomon, who carried the royal prerogative to a great height, and ruled quite after the manner of a despot, built cities of his own for his cavalry and his chariots, not venturing to quarter them on the people. In the latter times, from the reign of Hezekiah, we find the kings still more circumscribed in their power, by their privy council.

But notwithstanding the limitations of the royal prerogative, imposed by the law of Moses and the jealousy of the people, there was yet, as Samuel had forewarned his countrymen there would be, a strong tendency to despotism, in the government of the Israelitish kings. Their will often became law, even in matters of the highest importance. How tyrannically did Saul act towards David, and those eighty priests, whom he caused to be put to death, without the shadow of a trial or a crime!⁹ In the condemnations and pardons pronounced by David, we also perceive the decisions of despotic authority. Solomon went still greater lengths in this respect, even to the deciding on life and death by his bare will and word.¹⁰

7 1 Samuel 11:5.

8 1 Samuel 14:44-45.

9 1 Samuel 22:17-18.

10 1 Kings 2:25.

 

The notion that the king in person should be the supreme judge, a doctrine peculiarly Asiatic, tended strongly to promote the despotism of the Israelitish monarchs. Of the king, therefore, as chief judge, it will be necessary to speak somewhat in detail. It is one of the first ideas of the orientals respecting their king, and what they naturally expect of him, that he should himself administer justice. Hence we are not surprised to find it related by Herodotus that the Medes once obtained a king from the following circumstance. A man who had great reputation for wisdom and integrity, and to whom almost all were wont to resort as an arbiter in cases of dispute, refused at last, from the neglect of his domestic concerns occasioned by it, to decide upon their quarrels, or to listen to their applications for that purpose; and thus he forced them to choose him for their king. The more ancient nations are, and the nearer to their origin, the more prevalent do we find this idea of a king. Indeed, while nations are yet in their infancy, and the number of the people small, it is easier to act upon this doctrine. The king of a thousand families may do what to the king of a million would be impossible.

In a great nation, the king cannot, in his own person, exercise the office of judge, without materially injuring the general interests of the citizens. He cannot have time to inform himself sufficiently of such a multiplicity of lawsuits as he must be called upon to decide. Hence, either many a litigant will not obtain a hearing at all, or causes in general will not be sufficiently investigated, and arbitrary and unrighteous decisions will follow. The mischief is still greater when the king is very gracious and gives free access to all his subjects. In that case, he is apt to be overwhelmed with trifles, and villainy takes advantage of his goodness to effect the ruin of the innocent and the simple. On the other hand, if his subjects have not free access to him, another evil arises, of no less magnitude, for then his ministers may be guilty of the grossest injustice and oppression, and yet the sovereign know nothing about it. In Asia, it is more practicable for the king to be judge in his own person than in Europe, because there, justice is in general very summary, and independent of settled forms. Still, this does not make it less liable to abuse, nor the actual abuse less mischievous in its consequences.

If the first kings of Israel assumed the office of judge, the fault lay in the manners of the East. Moses is not responsible for it. He did indeed ordain that the king should be a daily student of his law, but not that he should discharge the office of a universal judge. It is, undoubtedly, highly useful to a king to be acquainted with civil law, that he may keep his eye on his subordinates, and know whether they decide conformably to it. In this view, it would appear, Moses desired that the king should not be ignorant of jurisprudence, but he did not mean to constitute him the daily judge of his people. Let the following circumstances be considered. Moses himself found, by experience, that it was beyond his power to determine all the disputes among the people, and, therefore, he appointed other judges of various grades; yet, in matters which could not be decided by written law, known usage, or manifest equity, he established an appeal to himself, that, on such occasions, he might consult God, and enact new laws by his direction.¹¹ Could he, then, have thought of imposing on the kings a burden, which he was himself unable to bear? The king was not a prophet, neither did he, like Moses, enjoy the privilege of immediate intercourse with God. Consequently he could not, by a direct consultation with the unerring one, pronounce an infallible judgment. The high priest, according to the constitution of Moses, was the supreme jurist. Certainly, the legislator, who devoted one whole tribe to the study of jurisprudence, and constituted its head the supreme legal authority, could never have intended that the king, occupied as he must be with the cares of government and with the conduct of wars, should in addition be overwhelmed with the investigation of lawsuits, which could not, as a consequence, fail to be decided too much in the summary style of military procedure.

All this was, undoubtedly, in the plan and intention of Moses. Yet, on its actual institution, and as matter of fact, the Israelitish monarchy was not, in this respect, thus wisely regulated. Without inquiry, without trial, without the intervention of any impartial tribunal, Saul, condemned to death eighty innocent priests, and, among them, the high priest himself, together with their wives and children.¹² David was far from being a tyrant; yet, on some occasions, he had recourse to judicial procedure equally summary, and without allowing other judges to interfere.¹³ Even his acts of grace took place without those preliminary and circumstantial inquiries, which, in governments not despotic, are deemed necessary to render them valid, and to prevent artifice and fraud from abusing the royal clemency, to the scandal of justice and the prejudice of the country. O this, a memorable instance is afforded in the pardon of the supposed son of the widow of Tekoah.¹⁴ Had the king instituted the least inquiry into the facts of the case, he could not have been inveigled into a condemnation of himself.

11 Exodus 18, Numbers 15:32-36.

12 1 Samuel 21:11-19.

13 2 Samuel 1:5-16, 4:9-12, 14:4-11; 1 Kings 2:5-9.

14 2 Samuel 14:4-11.

 

In the time of this king, the defect, which had thus attended the administration of justice, broke out into a formidable evil. As long as David was king of Judah alone, it was not beyond his power, in some measure at least, to execute the office of judge. But when he became king of all Israel, and his known humanity and love of justice probably induced too many of his subjects, all of whom had free access to his presence, to bring their causes immediately before him, he found himself overpowered with business, and the course of law became tedious, to a degree till then unknown in the East. The complaint does not appear to have been that unjust decisions were rendered, but that, for want of time to hear them, even clear cases could not be decided. It is probable that the course of law was still rapid, in comparison with what it is with us; but Asia is so much accustomed to summary justice, that the least delay there seems a great grievance. It was not imputed to negligence in David that he did not do more than one man could do, and the tears with which Jerusalem, where he was best known, accompanied him in his flight from Absalom impress us with a favorable idea of his previous government. Absalom, however, availed himself of the opportunity which the tediousness of justice presented him, to seduce the affections of the people from his father. He placed himself at the entrance of the palace and questioned the complainants, who came from the provinces to the capital, concerning their suits. Having heard their statements, he told every one that his case was clear, and that it was greatly to be regretted that the king, oppressed with business, would appoint no one to listen to complaints. At the same time, he expressed a wish that the king would commit the task to him, in which case every man might look for speedy justice.¹⁵ By this artifice, for which a departure from the true intent of the Mosaic constitution furnished the occasion, he excited a general rebellion, which was attended with much bloodshed. Without any battle, the universal discontent of the tribes drove David from the throne, nor did he recover it till the blood of many citizens was spilt. It is not mentioned in the history, what measures the king took after his restoration to correct those defects in judicial procedure, which had almost cost him his crown. We know, however, that, in the latter part of his reign, he appointed several thousands of Levites as judges.¹⁶ With these he probably filled some of the higher tribunals, which administered justice in the king’s name. The Levites in the provinces are expressly said to have had charge of all matters pertaining to God and the king.¹⁷ Of course, they must have had power to administer justice in the king’s name.

Notwithstanding this, however, the king seems to have reserved the right of pronouncing arbitrary sentence, even in cases where life was concerned. The innocent blood, which Manasseh and Jehoiakim are said to have shed,¹⁸ renders this more than probable. It is true that blood may be unjustly shed, with all the forms of law, as in the case of Naboth.¹⁹ But such instances are rare. If a tyrant shed much innocent blood, it affords ground of presumption that he has the power of pronouncing on life and death in himself. At least European kings, even the most absolute of them, are prohibited from shedding much innocent blood, except, indeed, in the case of the hundreds of thousands whom they sacrifice in unjust wars.

15 2 Samuel 15:2-6.

16 1 Chronicles 23:4, 26:29-32.

17 1 Chronicles 26:30,32.

18 2 Kings 21:16, 24:4.

19 1 Kings 21:1-14.

 

The mention of war naturally suggests the inquiry, how far the power of the Israelitish sovereigns extended in military matters. On this point, the sacred book leaves us very much in the dark. Whether the king could, of himself alone, and without consulting the states-general, proclaim war, and conclude peace, is a point which must be reckoned among the chasms in our knowledge of Hebrew law. Here it would seem the jus publicum of the Israelites was itself defective, because, on the first choice of a king, they had no ancient usage to guide them, and Moses, who did not himself establish a monarchy, but only permitted its future establishment, had said nothing on this point, but left all to the determination of the Israelites. It is certain that Saul made his first war without consulting the people.²⁰ The case, however, was one of peculiar urgency, so much so, that he may almost be said to have been forced into hostilities, in defense of the threatened liberties of the Gileadites.²¹ From this case, therefore, nothing positive can be inferred in regard to the general right of the Hebrew sovereigns concerning war.

The royal prerogative extended to ecclesiastical affairs. Indeed, the rights of the kings in reference to matters of this nature were so great as to excite our wonder, especially when we consider that the priests and Levites, as a sort of nobility, were intended to balance the power of the kings. They could condemn even the high priest himself to death. Not only did Saul,²² in his rage and madness, do this; but Solomon²³ speaks as if he could have done it, and, out of pure clemency, was satisfied with deposing him. The kings exercised the right of reforming abuses in religion, and gave attention to the management of public worship as the most efficacious means of promoting religion and morality, and so of securing the obedience of the people to the supreme, invisible, divine Sovereign of Israel. Of this exercise of the royal prerogative, we have many examples, of which none are more memorable than those of David and Hezekiah. It was altogether suitable to the Hebrew constitution, in which the worship of one only God was the fundamental principle. Under that constitution, false religion was treason to the state, and it was proper that the kings should have the power of exterminating so dangerous an enemy.

Among the prerogatives of the Hebrew sovereigns must also be placed the right of pardon. That this power should exist somewhere in the state is highly expedient and even necessary. A civil law without all possibility of dispensation would be subject to very great inconveniences, and would be the occasion of sometimes inflicting very grievous wrong. Without a power of sometimes remitting punishments, innocence might suffer by the very law, which was made for its protection. That the right of pardon was exercised by the Israelitish kings is beyond a doubt. Nor has the exercise of it always the effect of mere partiality, but of principle and a consideration of circumstances. David not only pardoned his son Absalom, but, in a supposed case, which was laid before him, he granted a murderer his life, who was represented to have killed his brother, because the mother herself interceded in his behalf, and his father’s race would have been extinct, had he suffered the penalty of the law.²⁴

20 1 Samuel 11:7.

21 1 Samuel 11:2.

22 1 Samuel 22:17-18.

23 1 Kings 2:26-27.

24 2 Samuel 14:4-21.

 

I now pass to a consideration of the royal revenues. Moses left no ordinance concerning them. With regard to what later laws and usages introduced on this head, the following particulars may be gleaned from the books of the Old Testament. The several branches of the king’s revenue were presents, tithes, royal demesnes, bond service, the right of pasturage in the Arabian deserts, the spoils of vanquished enemies, the tribute of conquered nations, and, in the end, the profits of a lucrative foreign commerce.

1. Presents. Long before the time of the kings, and even before the age of Moses, there sprung up in the east a custom, often mentioned in the Persian history, and noticed by Asiatic travelers, that whoever paid a visit to a person of higher rank carried with him a suitable present. Joseph, as prime minister of Egypt, received such a present from his brethren.²⁵ Saul did not presume to wait on Samuel, the judge, without a present.²⁶ This was, therefore, the most ancient source of a king’s revenue, prior to all tributes and demesnes. That Saul actually enjoyed a revenue of this kind is certain.²⁷ Whether the tax continued to be paid to his successors does not appear. There is no trace of it after the reign of Saul. It is not improbable that David abolished so unseemly an impost, and admitted every petitioner into his presence without subjecting him to any expense.

2. Tithes. In 1 Samuel 8:15-17, mention is made of the tenth of the produce of the fields, the vineyards, and the flocks, as the right of the future king. This, on his actual appointment, was the third tenth which every Israelite had to pay. The first was given to the Levites;²⁸ the second was appropriated to the sacrifice-feasts, to which were invited priests, Levites, friends, orphans, and strangers.²⁹ None but a very fruitful country could have borne the burden of an impost to the extent of three tenths of its produce.

25 Genesis 43:11-25.

26 1 Samuel 9:7.

27 1 Samuel 10:27, 16:20.

28 Numbers 18:21-32, Leviticus 27:30-33.

29 Deuteronomy 12:17-19, 14:22-29, 26:12-15.

 

3. Royal demesnes. Samuel mentions a demesne, to which the king would have a right; for, says he, "He will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants,"³⁰ i.e., in lieu of salaries. This seems inconsistent with the Mosaic law, which divided the whole of Palestine among the Israelites and prohibited the alienation of their land. Nevertheless, it is certain that the king had a demesne.³¹ It is likely, that at first the kings took possession only of the spots, which had not been previously appropriated and improved, of which there might be found a considerable number, particularly beyond Jordan, and about the rills in the Arabian deserts. Still, that will not sufficiently explain the passage, cited a little above; for it is there said, the king would take the best parts of every sort of landed property.

We must, therefore, seek some other mode of providing him with demesnes. It is certain that the kings exercised the right of bestowing the inheritance of state criminals upon other persons.³² It is not improbable that they availed themselves of the same right, to increase the royal demesnes by confiscations. Indeed, we have an instance of this, in the case of Nabal, who was stoned on a false charge of treason, and his estate annexed to the king’s demesnes.³³ This mode of increasing their lands must have formed a strong temptation to wicked kings to put innocent persons to death for pretended crimes, in order to seize and appropriate their property. Need we wonder, that, in the Hebrew history, we find so frequent mention of the shedding of innocent blood?

All this is confirmed, and rendered certain, by what we find in Ezekiel. That prophet was favored with a vision of the future reformation of the Israelitish church and state.³⁴ In it he tells us that the prince will then have his own portion, which he must neither alienate nor enlarge. It is very distinctly enjoined upon the king not to take the people’s inheritance away from them by oppression, and not to thrust them out of their possessions. It is further enjoined upon him not to give lands to his family out of the people’s portions, but out of his own. This clearly indicates the practices, and, I may add, the abuses, of preceding times.

The olive and sycamore grounds, in that part of the territory of Judah which lay nearest the sea and was called the lowlands, belonged to the king’s demesnes. It is distinctly stated that David placed one officer over the trees in that district, and another over the oil stores.³⁵

That the kings assigned a part of the royal demesnes to their servants, in lieu of salary, appears unquestionable.³⁶ At a time when the sovereign could be possessed of but little money, this was the natural way of maintaining and rewarding his servants.

30 1 Samuel 8:14.

31 Ecclesiastes 2:4-6, 1 Chronicles 27:26-31.

32 2 Samuel 16:4.

33 1 Kings 21:15-16.

34 Ezekiel 45:7-8, 47:16-18.

35 1 Chronicles 27:28.

36 1 Samuel 8:14, 22:7.

 

4. Bond service. For the cultivation of their lands, the Israelitish kings, governing a country where slavery was permitted, would naturally require servile labor. Accordingly, we find bond service mentioned by Samuel among the royal rights, established by usage among the neighboring kingdoms, and which would be claimed and exercised by the Hebrew sovereigns, whenever monarchy should be instituted.³⁷ In process of time, these services seem to have been increased and altered, so that they became very burdensome and very distasteful to the Israelites.³⁸ It was probably this which gave occasion, first to the complaints, and then to the rebellion, in the reign of Rehoboam.

5. The right of pasturage in the Arabian deserts. This right belonged to the king, in common with his subjects. We find David taking advantage of this privilege, and keeping large herds of cattle, sheep, goats, asses, and camels, partly in Sharon and partly in Arabia, the greater part of them, no doubt, in the latter place.³⁹ Among the officers who had charge of them, two Arabians are mentioned, Obil the Ishmaelite, superintendent of the camels, and Jaziz the Hagarite, superintendent of the sheep.

6. The spoils of vanquished enemies partly flowed into the royal treasury.⁴⁰

7. Among the royal revenues must be reckoned the tribute paid by conquered nations. These are often mentioned under the name of gifts.⁴¹

8. Commerce. Solomon discovered a new source of royal revenue, which must have been very productive. He engaged in an extensive and lucrative foreign commerce, trading chiefly in gold, silver, precious stones, spices, linen, and horses.⁴²